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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s global economy needs global agreements to facilitate 
commerce not onlywithin a limited internal market area but internationally. 
And what has been lacking for years is a convention to provide for judgment 
recognition and enforcement that mirrors the reality of today’s trade, which 
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with cyberspace and new technologies, crosses borders instantaneously. The 
Hague Conference on Private International Law has been laboring in this 
field for almost fifty years, planting seeds from 1971. It is on the brink of 
completing such a convention which offers the promise of an instrument 
incorporating sufficient flexibility to allow multiple legal systems to join 
while leaving room for growth with changing technologies and further 
harmonization of this area of law. 
This Article provides the background on the negotiations through the 
years, especially the last twenty-five plus years, and considers how the 
instruments have changed in response to evolving dynamics in cross-border 
trade and internal changes at The Hague Conference. Part IV provides a 
general introduction to the current draft that is to be negotiated at the final 
Diplomatic Session in June 2019 and Part V considers issues remaining both 
generally and for the United States’ participation. Part VI evaluates the 
proposed convention and considers what changes it will bring domestically 
and internationally. And it answers the question of whether the world needs 
this global judgments convention and why the U.S. needs to be a willing 
partner. 
I. THE PAST AS PROLOGUE 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law’s modern efforts 
at a judgments convention date back to at least 1971, when the Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters was first signed.1 The convention failed to attract more 
than five Contracting States,2 which is attributed in part to an awkward 
bilateralization process that required Contracting States to enter into 
Supplementary Agreements with each other,3 largely defeating the value and 
 
 1.  HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L LAW, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS (1971), 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/bacf7323-9337-48df-9b9a-ef33e62b43be.pdf. It is interesting to note that in 
the preamble, there is no reference to either judicial cooperation or international trade, both of which 
appear in the Declaration to the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which [hereinafter Choice 
of Court Convention], also presumably will appear prominently in the preamble of the new Judgments 
Convention. HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L LAW, CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 
(2005), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-e0972510d98b.pdf. 
  For a thorough discussion of the history of the 1971 Convention as well as the later Judgments 
work, see Hans van Loon, Towards a Global Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgements in Civil or Commercial Matters, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Nišu, 
COLLECTION OF PAPERS, FACULTY OF LAW UNIVERSITY OF NIŠ, Issue 82/2019 (forthcoming 2019). The 
Journal can be found at  HeinOnline. 
 2.  Id. Cyprus, The Netherlands, and Portugal joined in the first fifteen years; Kuwait (2002) and 
Albania (2010) joined much later.  
 3.  Id. art. 21.  
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efficiencies of a multilateral convention. 
Two decades later, in 1992–93, The Hague Conference was persuaded 
by the United States, and primarily Arthur von Mehren, to undertake a mixed 
convention on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement. Much has been 
written about these efforts.4 The initial suggestion of the United States 
incorporated von Mehren’s idea: a mixed convention with three categories 
of jurisdictional bases and corresponding recognition rules.5  Many member 
states, who had little trouble having their judgments recognized and enforced 
in the U.S., saw the negotiations as an opportunity to reduce what they 
perceived to be exorbitant aspects of U.S. personal jurisdiction, particularly 
general doing business jurisdiction, activity-based jurisdiction, and 
jurisdiction based solely on service of process within the jurisdiction (tag 
jurisdiction).6 They were less interested in getting their judgments enforced 
in the U.S., while U.S. businesses and plaintiffs’ lawyers were focused on 
increasing their ability to recover on their U.S. judgments outside of the 
 
 4.  There is extensive literature on The Hague jurisdiction and judgments negotiations and drafts. 
See generally SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION (2003); Peter 
Nygh, Arthur’s Baby: The Hague Negotiations for a World-Wide Judgments Convention, in LAW AND 
JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 151 (James A. R. 
Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002); Ronald A. Brand, Jurisdictional Common Ground: In 
Search of a Global Convention, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 11 (James A. R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002); Louise Ellen 
Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative 
to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543 (2005); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the 
Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89 (1999); Linda J. Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the 
International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 
319 (2002); Peter Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a Worldwide 
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: Some Initial Lessons, in A 
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 263 (John J. Barcelo & 
Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002); Arthur T. von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the 
Design of Recognition Conventions, 24 BROOK J. INT’L L. 17 (1998).  See also HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. 
INT’L LAW, BIBLIOGRAPHY RELATED TO THE JUDGMENTS PROJECT (2018), https://assets.hcch.net/ 
docs/bd35517f-09ea-47d6-95ad-865d2c162504.pdf; HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L LAW, THE 
JUDGMENTS PROJECT (2018), https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments.  
 5.  Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach 
for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 282–85 (1994).  The white list was to 
contain clearly acceptable bases (requiring recognition of resulting judgments); the black list comprised 
unacceptable bases (excluding recognition); and the grey list contained bases permitted under national 
law but otherwise left undecided (neither requiring nor excluding recognition of judgments under the 
convention).  Id. 
 6.  See Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of Parallel Proceedings and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 60 
(2004).  Ironically, the U.S. Supreme Court, in three cases from 2011 to 2014 (Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011)), limited general doing business jurisdiction and constricted specific 
jurisdiction to the extent that U.S. jurisdiction is narrower than that under the Brussels Regulation, a point 
highlighted in the plurality decision of Justice Kennedy in Nicastro. See id. at 885– 86. 
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country. Of course, enforcing U.S. judgments abroad was not critical since 
many foreign company assets were still in the U.S. and subject to the broad 
reach of domestic jurisdiction and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.7 
The initial drafts looked like the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgments.8  The draft reflected the composition of The 
Hague Conference in 1993, member countries who were largely from, and 
focused on, Europe and western legal systems, although most of the 
negotiations occurred prior to the shift in competence from individual 
countries to the community under the Treaty of Amsterdam.9 
This came to a head in 2001 at the First Half diplomatic session, when 
everyone expected that the “Hague magic” would wipe away the huge 
differences and result in a final convention in twenty-one days. If one looks 
at the draft from June 2001,10 it is more than thirty pages with over 200 
footnotes (as long as a law review article). The negotiations themselves were 
different from earlier meetings as there was agreement to operate this First 
Part not by voting but by consensus—a process already used by UNCITRAL, 
another intergovernmental entity for harmonization of private international 
law.11 In fact, it had been agreed that while the First Part of the diplomatic 
session would proceed by consensus, the second part would revert to the 
traditional voting system. There was, however, no second part, so when 
consensus was adopted for the First Part of the diplomatic session, there was 
no agreement that it would be used again or become the modus operandi for 
 
 7.   U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 8.  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2. The Brussels Convention was replaced by Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, amended by Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 1496/2002 of 21 August 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 225) 1. The regulation was amended 
again, effective January 10, 2015. See Regulation (EU) No. 1215/12 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 December 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 [hereinafter Brussels I Recast].  
 9.  Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 73m, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1; 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 65, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 
O.J. (C 321) 37. See infra to section on changes in HCCH.  
 10.  The 2001 draft of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, an interim text, was drawn up at Part One of the Nineteenth Diplomatic Session, 
which was held from June 6–22, 2001. See HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L LAW, INTERIM TEXT - 
SUMMARY OF THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSION IN COMMISSION II OF THE FIRST PART OF THE 
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, 6–22 JUNE 6-22, 2001, PREPARED BY THE PERMANENT BUREAU AND THE CO-
REPORTERS (2001), https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=3499&dtid=35.  
 11.  Although I use the term “private international law,” that phrase in the United States has 
increasingly been understood to encompass the areas covered by the United States State Department, 
Office of Private International Law.  For a thorough explanation of private international law in the United 
States, see David P. Stewart, Private International Law: A Dynamic and Developing Field, 30 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 1121 (2009).  Professor Stewart is the former Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International 
Law, Department of State, and headed up efforts to implement several conventions. 
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Hague Conference negotiations.12  The areas of nonconsensus are in 
brackets. Jurisdiction provisions are almost all in brackets; there was much 
greater consensus in the recognition and enforcement provisions.13 One 
delegate made an intervention at the close of the negotiations stating that it 
had been a wonderful opportunity for a three-week course on comparative 
law but “unfortunately my government expects me to come back with more.” 
In February 2002, the U.S. announced that it would not continue with a 
comprehensive jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement convention. 
Many of the obstacles that ultimately prevented the adoption of a 
comprehensive jurisdiction and judgments convention with U.S. 
participation were not apparent at the beginning of the negotiations, but arose 
only later, such as the emergence of the internet and electronic commerce, 
the increasingly prominent role of the consumer, and the rather rapid 
integration of the European Community.14 The documents of the Hague 
Conference itself point out many of the difficulties.15  Some of the problems 
plaguing The Hague Conference mirrored the difficulties within the 
European Union, such as the accommodation of both civil and common-law 
approaches to jurisdiction and judgments. While the European Union 
countries have common political goals and a Court of Justice to settle such 
disputes, The Hague Conference lacks both a set of shared substantive values 
 
 12.  See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions of the Special Commission 
of May 2000 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, Prel. Doc. No. 10 (June 2000), 
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2000concl_e.pdf. The procedure was officially changed in 
2005. See infra note 55. 
 13.   Hague Conference on Private International Law, supra note 10.  
 14.  See Fausto Pocar, The Drafting of a World-Wide Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments: Which Format for the Negotiations in the Hague?, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A 
MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 191 (James A. R. Nafziger & 
Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002). 
 15.  Following the June 2001 diplomatic session, there were informal meetings among different 
member nations, exploring ways to continue the work on the Judgments Convention. For a discussion of 
the state of negotiations, see Hague Conference on Private International Law, Some Reflections on the 
Present State of Negotiations on the Judgments Project in the Context of the Future Work Programme of 
the Conference, at 4–9, Prel. Doc. No. 16 (Feb. 2002), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd16e.pdf.  
Two other documents on The Hague Conference website, both produced by Avril D. Haines, provide 
insight into the problems that the Conference has faced, especially in connection with the internet and 
also the problems related to choice of court agreements. “[T]he Hague Conference mirrored the 
difficulties within the European Union, such as the accommodation of both civil and common-law 
approaches to jurisdiction and judgments. While the European Union has common political goals and a 
Court of Justice to settle such disputes, the Hague Conference lacks both a set of shared substantive values 
and a tribunal to decide when consensus is impossible. This made drafting a treaty difficult and agreement 
in the area of jurisdiction and judgments ultimately impossible.” Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice 
of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 543, 546 (2005). See Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Impact of the Internet 
on the Judgments Project: Thoughts for the Future, Prel. Doc. No. 17 (Feb. 2002), https://assets.hcch.net/ 
upload/wop/gen_pd17e.pdf.  
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and a tribunal to decide when consensus is impossible. This made drafting a 
treaty difficult and agreement in the area of jurisdiction and judgments 
ultimately impossible.16  Proposals were made to look for a smaller area of 
consensus, that of choice of court agreements, and the resulting Choice of 
Court Convention was finished in June 2005.17 
II. A DECADE AND MORE OF CHANGES 
In 2002, the comprehensive judgments convention/project was 
“shelved” in place of the more limited Choice of Court convention. The 
Judgments Project sat “in storage” for a decade. What happened during that 
period to suggest that it might be time to reconsider, and why might the time 
be ripe now?   
The Hague Conference underwent significant changes from when the 
Judgments Project started in 1993 to when it ended in 2002, but underwent 
even more changes after that. As mentioned earlier, in 1992 The Hague 
Conference was very Eurocentric. Under the leadership of then-Secretary 
General Hans van Loon, The Hague Conference moved from a largely 
western European entity to a global body.18 In fact, in 1990, it had only thirty-
three member states, as compared to forty-seven in 2000, and an additional 
twenty-eight by 2013 when the total was seventy-five (one of the members 
being the EU).19  One can also look at the increase in contracting states to 
the four international legal cooperation treaties (Apostille, Service, 
Evidence, Access to Justice) all of which increased at least 50% in the short 
time from 2000 to 2013.20 Today there are eighty-two countries that are 
members of The Hague Conference, as well as the EU which is a member as 
well21 and more than 150 countries are members or contracting states to one 
 
 16.  Teitz, supra note 15, at 546. 
 17.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, 37: Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, at Art. 21 (June 30, 2005), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-
e0972510d98b.pdf. [hereinafter Choice of Court Agreements]. See generally Marta Pertegás and Louise 
Ellen Teitz, Prospects for the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, in A 
COMMITMENT TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS VAN LOON 465 (2013); 
Louise Ellen Teitz, Implementing the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention for the Twenty-first 
Century: Providing a Viable Alternative to Arbitration, in VISITING PROFESSORS ALL’ALMA MATER: 
LEZIONI ALLA FACOLTÀ DI GIURISPRUDENZA DELL’UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA 2006-2010 (2011).  
 18.  The current Secretary General, Christophe Bernasconi, who took over on July 1, 2013, has 
continued to emphasize growth in membership and added new members. 
 19.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Annual Report 2013, at 10–12 (2014), 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/6e0c6044-fca2-46cc-a6d8-41a26bf06dad.pdf.  
 20.  Id. at 32–33. 
 21.  The Statute of The Hague Conference was amended in June 2005 to provide for membership 
for REIOs—regional Economic Integration Organizations. Andrea Schulz, The Accession of the 
European Community to the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
939, 942–43 (2007). 
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or more Hague Conventions.22 The global nature of The Hague Conference 
and the shift from a western European focus can also be seen in the current 
two regional offices, one for Latin America in Argentina and one for the Asia 
Pacific region in Hong Kong. The regional office in Latin America has 
increasingly played an important role in preparing countries for participation 
in Special Commissions, and the dynamic nature of the Latin American 
delegations has served in some cases and in some areas of Hague Conference 
work as a counter-balance to the EU, which has competence in the 
Judgments Convention and speaks for all its members. 
The change in the EU and the shift in competence after 1999 had a 
significant impact in the stalemate of the 2001 negotiations. But the real 
effect of the change in competence has been that as the common judicial area 
has developed its European regional instruments, these regulations have 
become almost “operational documents” for the Judgments negotiations. 
What is being negotiated must be as consistent as possible and include 
critical aspects of Brussels I Recast. For example, the jurisdictional filter for 
exclusive jurisdiction under Article 6(c), dealing with tenancies of 
immovable property “for a period of more than six months,” has to be 
included even though from a U.S. perspective this could create problems 
with our existing law. The same is true in regard to special treatment for 
consumers and the jurisdictional filters in Article 5(2). While obviously the 
U.S. has required changes to comply with constitutional requirements of due 
process, thus necessitating an “activity basis” in the filters for contract and 
tort such as in Article 5(1)(g) and 5(1)(j), U.S. personal jurisdiction is not 
codified and has no specific regulation to serve as a guide for the 
negotiations. The role of a European patent court is also driving some of the 
negotiations, including those concerning whether to include in the 
convention judgments from “common courts” and how to define that term. 
The increased harmonization of European law since 2001 creates some 
rigidity but also more consistency. It is also a harbinger of the growing trend 
of unification/harmonization of law on a regional basis, not only in Europe. 
Another significant change appears in the representation of delegations 
to The Hague Conference, at least as to Special Commissions and Diplomatic 
Sessions. The delegations once populated by academics are increasingly 
composed of governmental representatives, who often represent their 
countries not only at the Hague Conference but at UNCITRAL and other 
regional entities.23 Even the Hague Conference Permanent Bureau, the name 
for the Secretariat, has moved away from law professors as the “diplomat 
 
 22.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, About HCCH: A World Organisation. . ., 
https://www.hcch.net/en/about (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). 
 23.  In many areas, especially family law, delegations include active judges. 
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lawyers,” with the last academic departing in spring 2017.24 Another change 
in the complexion of delegations in general to Hague Conference Special 
Commissions has been the inclusion of experts in complex substantive areas 
of the law, such as intellectual property or family law, as opposed to the 
experts in private international law. As intellectual property plays an 
increasing role in cross-border trade and commerce, its importance in 
negotiations has increased. 
The Hague Conference has not completed a hard law instrument (that 
is, a treaty), since the 2007 Maintenance Convention—more than a decade. 
The Hague Principles, its first real soft law instrument, was finished in 2015. 
And the nature of ratification and entry into force has also changed, even 
while the number of entities needed to bring a convention into force has 
decreased.25 The Choice of Court Convention took more than ten years; and 
the 2006 Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of 
Securities held with an Intermediary also took more than ten years. What this 
suggests is the possibility that some conventions could be out-of-date even 
before they enter into force with the rapid change of law.26 This could be 
especially true for conventions that include intellectual property or some of 
the expanding technologies. 
All of these changes contributed to a climate by 2012 that was quite 
different from that in 2001, especially when combined with the increasing 
global trade and the need for dispute resolution to support this trade. Indeed, 
the last several years have seen the burgeoning of international commercial 
courts, many conducting the procedures in English, in Dubai, Singapore, 
Germany, The Netherlands, and Belgium.27 Meanwhile, the goal of limiting 
U.S. direct jurisdiction has increasingly been of less interest to other 
countries as the U.S. Supreme Court since 2011 has taken care of what was 
viewed as exorbitant jurisdiction based on general doing business 
jurisdiction as well as narrowed specific jurisdiction against foreign 
corporations, depending on how they structure their distribution channels. 
 
 24.  First Secretary Pertegás, Professor at Antwerp University and now also Professor at Maastricht 
University, had primary responsibility for the Judgments Project’s following its rebirth from 2010/2011 
and for the Choice of Court Convention from 2008, as well as the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts. 
 25.  Compare Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 31, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, 
with Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an 
Intermediary art. 19, July 5, 2006, 17 U.S.T. 401. 
 26.  One advantage to the building-up approach may be leaving room for further development and 
harmonization of law. 
 27.  The Belgian proposal is more akin to arbitration than litigation. For a discussion of the use of 
specialized commercial courts in the U.S., see John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915 (2012). 
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III. “THE THIRD TIME IS THE CHARM” 
In 2011, the Council on General Affairs and Policy (“the Council”),28 
considered revisiting civil and commercial judgments,29 a project raised in 
2010 but initially put on hold until the Choice of Court Convention entered 
into force.30 An Experts’ Group of approximately twenty-five, representing 
different legal traditions and geographic diversity, was convened in the 
Hague in 2012, focused primarily on policy decisions, the most critical issue 
 
 28.  The Council on General Affairs and Policy governs The Hague Conference activities and is 
made up of all member states and meets each spring, currently in March, to determine the work Agenda 
of the Hague Conference for the following year. 
 29.  From 2010: Continuation of the Judgments Project: 
The Council noted the suggestions made in Preliminary Document No 14, including a proposal 
to convene an expert group to explore the options presented in this document. The Council 
recalled the valuable work which has been done in the course of the Judgments Project and 
noted that this could possibly provide a basis for further work. The Council concluded, 
however, that such exploratory work, including the appointment of an expert group, will be 
further considered only following the entry into force of the 2005 Choice of Court Convention. 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the 
Council, at 3 (Apr. 5–7, 2010), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010concl_e.pdf.  
From 2011: Continuation of the Judgments Project: 
The Council recalled the conclusion adopted at its 2010 meeting concerning the continuation 
of the Judgments Project and stressed that any future work in this area should not interfere with 
the ongoing efforts to promote the entry into force of the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice 
of Court Agreements. The Council concluded that a small expert group should be set up to 
explore the background of the Judgments Project and recent developments with the aim to 
assess the possible merits of resuming the Judgments Project. The Permanent Bureau should 
report back to the Council in 2012 on progress.  
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted 
by the Council, at 3 (Apr. 5–7, 2011), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/6927488c-4415-4659-a2f0-
e748fbc0a3f0.pdf.  
From 2012: Continuation of the Judgments Project: 
The Council welcomed the exploratory work conducted by the Experts’ Group and its 
Conclusions and Recommendations on possible future work.  
. . . .  
The Council acknowledged that in working towards a future instrument, it will be important to 
begin by working on an agreed core of essential provisions. Consistent with that 
acknowledgement, the Council decided to establish a Working Group whose initial task shall 
be to prepare proposals for consideration by a Special Commission in relation to provisions for 
inclusion in a future instrument relating to recognition and enforcement of judgments, including 
jurisdictional filters.  
. . . .  
The Council acknowledged that the desirability and feasibility of making provisions in relation 
to matters of jurisdiction (including parallel proceedings) in this or another future instrument 
require further study and discussion. The Council invited the Experts’ Group to reconvene in 
order to consider and make recommendations on these matters.  
. . . .  
The Permanent Bureau will report regularly to the Council on progress on this work, which will 
maintain oversight of the work  
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the 
Council, at 3 (Apr. 17–20, 2012), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2012concl_en.pdf.  
 30.  See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Continuation of the Judgments Project, 
Prel. Doc. 14 (Feb. 2010), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010pd14e.pdf.  
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being the scope of any judgments convention.31 There was strong pressure 
by most of the experts for a convention addressing direct jurisdiction as well 
as recognition and enforcement, especially from some European members. 
The U.S. strongly opposed such an approach after the disastrous results of 
the 2001 draft and even rejected a two-track or protocol approach of 
simultaneous work.32 
The U.S. adamantly refused to consider direct jurisdiction and in an 
effort to achieve a compromise, a procedure was set up with an Experts’ 
Group to address policy issues and a Working Group to address drafting. 
Eventually the EU and others agreed that the Experts’ Group would wait to 
address direct jurisdiction until after a draft convention addressing only 
recognition and enforcement was completed. This meant that the recognition 
and enforcement provisions had to be based on indirect jurisdiction, not 
direct.33 The Working Group met five times from 2013 until October 2015, 
preparing a draft for a Special Commission to consider. The Special 
Commission (composed of and open to all member countries and their 
representatives, as well as some observers and NGOs) met four times: June 
2016, February 2017, November 2017, and May 2018, in preparation for a 
diplomatic session which would consider the final draft of the Special 
Commission and negotiate a final convention, now scheduled for June 
2019.34 
 
 31.  See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Ongoing Work on Judgments, Choice of 
Court Convention and Judgments Project, Prel. Doc. 7 (2014), 
https://www.hcch.net/en/governance/council-on-general-affairs/archive; Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, Ongoing Work on International Litigation, Prel. Doc. 3 (2013), 
https://www.hcch.net/en/governance/council-on-general-affairs/archive. 
 32.  Id. In March 2019, the Council on General Affairs and Policy met and  set a date of February 
2020 for the Experts’ Group to meet. 
“5. Council confirmed the mandate given to the Permanent Bureau to plan a further meeting of the 
Experts’ Group addressing matters relating to jurisdiction with a view to preparing an additional 
instrument. As requested by Council, the meeting will be held in the first week of February 2020. The 
Experts’ Group will provide an update to Council at its 2020 meeting.” 
Conclusions and Recommendations of Council, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/c4af61a8-d8bf-400e-9deb-
afcd87ab4a56.pdf. 
 33.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, supra note 1.  
 34.  At its March 2018 meeting, the Council on General Affairs and Policy instructed the Secretary 
General (SG) “to continue preparations for a Fourth and final Special Commission in May 2018.”  Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, at 
1 (Apr. 13–15, 2018), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/715fc166-2d40-4902-8c6c-e98b3def3b92.pdf 
[hereinafter 2018 Conclusions and Recommendations].  The Council on General Affairs and Policy has 
not yet held its meeting of 2019. After the 2018 meeting, the Council on General Affairs and Policy issued 
a report stating:  
In line with this mandate, the Special Commission (SC) on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments met for the Fourth and final time from 24 to 29 May 2018 in The Hague 
to prepare a draft Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil 
or commercial matters.   
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The Working Group, in drafting the text of the Judgments Convention, 
utilized a system of building up a list of categories or bases for recognizing 
judgments, reminiscent of some of the categories present in the 1895 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, Hilton v. Guyot,35 the fountainhead of U.S. 
recognition of foreign judgments. These bases have been described as 
“jurisdictional filters” and utilize indirect jurisdiction. As consensus 
emerged or could be forged, more bases were added, with thirteen grounds 
currently, incorporated into Article 5 of the Convention and then some 
exclusive bases in Article 6. This approach of indirect jurisdiction built on 
the concept that bases for jurisdiction for initiating action and the bases for 
jurisdiction that are acceptable for recognizing a judgment are not 
coextensive in many legal systems, the latter recognition jurisdiction being 
more limited than the former initial jurisdiction. In the U.S. legal system, 
since jurisdiction is largely based on constitutional due process 
requirements, our direct and indirect jurisdiction are largely the same.36  In 
many systems there is a “jurisdictional gap,”37 such that their initial suits are 
 
. . . . 
The SC made very good progress and prepared the 2018 draft Convention.  The SC adopted the 
following Conclusions and Recommendations for the Council for decision: 
. . . .  
“In accordance with the mandate given by the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the 
Conference (“the Council”) at its meeting in March 2016, March 2017 and March 2018, the 
Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (“the Special 
Commission”) met in June 2016, February 2017, November 2017 and May 2018 in The Hague 
to prepare a draft Convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters. The draft Convention appears as an annex to this report. 
. . . . 
The Special Commission considers that it has completed the mandate conferred on it by the 
Council and that, as contemplated by the Council, work on the draft Convention has reached 
the point where a Diplomatic Session can be convened in mid-2019. The Special Commission 
notes the desirability of consultation and informal collaboration between Members in preparing 
for the Diplomatic Session. The Special Commission understands that the Academy Building 
would be available for a Diplomatic Session from 17 June to 2 July 2019. 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy, Judgments 
Project: Report on the Special Commission Meeting of May 2018 and Next Steps, at 2, Prel. Doc. No. 1 
(Oct. 2018), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/1580b17f-2e0f-4f19-9b40-bf6702678048.pdf (quoting 2018 
Conclusions and Recommendations). See also supra note 32. 
 35.   159 U.S. 113 (1895); Ronald A. Brand, New Challenges in the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Judgments 7 (Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 29, 2018), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3246053 (“Justice Gray’s 1895 opinion in Hilton v. Guyot provides the starting 
point for just about every analysis of the question of foreign judgment recognition.”). 
 36.  One example in the U.S. where there might be a difference in jurisdiction is quasi in rem and 
in Shaffer v Heitner, where the Court suggests that indirect jurisdiction could be different.  
Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the 
plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State 
where the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the 
existence of the debt as an original matter.  
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977).  
 37.  Ronald A. Brand, Understanding Judgments Recognition, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
877, 880 (2015). In the United States, this problem has resulted in the failure to understand the gap that 
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treated differently than incoming judgments from foreign countries. Some 
experts38 have suggested that we adopt a very simple rule that contracting 
states would recognize any judgment that would be allowed if it were a 
domestic judgment. In this way, there would be no “judgment 
discrimination”39 and no concern about multiple declarations in the text and 
inconsistent results. Although a simpler structure might be more acceptable 
to some common law jurisdictions and lead to more consistency in 
application, given the “jurisdictional gap,” the only viable option is to start 
with the simplest categories of harmonization and work to build consensus 
on more complicated jurisdictional situations. Examples of generally agreed 
categories are: where the court of origin is the defendant’s habitual 
residence,40 where the person against whom one seeks enforcement initiated 
the claim,41 and where there is express consent.42 There is the limited 
possibility of removing entire categories from scope through the declaration 
 
exists in some other legal systems between the bases of jurisdiction on which courts are allowed to hear 
a case in the first instance (bases of direct jurisdiction) and the bases of jurisdiction courts will accept as 
appropriate in the originating court of another state for purposes of the recognition of the resulting 
judgment (bases of indirect jurisdiction). 
 38.  See id. at 905 (describing the general international trend of no judgement discrimination).  
 39.  Prof. Ron Brand suggests that the movement of international law has been towards 
nondiscrimination, but it is still not likely to eliminate the jurisdictional gap: 
The general trend for more than half a century in international economic law has been to use 
treaties to move toward (and even to require) non-discrimination. Three factors, however, make 
it extremely difficult to move toward complete elimination of the jurisdiction gap approach to 
judgments recognition on a global basis. The first is that the European Union has embraced this 
discriminatory approach to judgments recognition, despite the European Commission’s efforts 
to reduce the effects of such discrimination in its original proposal for the Brussels I Recast 
Regulation. The second is that most other countries follow the Continental civil law approach 
to law generally, including on rules of private international law. The third is that, as the 
Commonwealth example demonstrates, even among the common law legal systems of the 
world, the United States tends to be an outlier in having no jurisdiction gap.  
Id. 
 40.  Hague Conference on Private International Law: Fourth Meeting of the Special Commission 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Judgments Convention: Revised Preliminary 
Explanatory Report, at No. 82, Prel. Doc. No. 10 (May 2018), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/7cd8bc44-
e2e5-46c2-8865-a151ce55e1b2.pdf; Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special 
Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, November 2017 Draft 
Convention, at Art. 5(1)(a) (November 13, 2017), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/2f0e08f1-c498-4d15-9dd4-
b902ec3902fc.pdf.  
 41.  November 2017 Draft Convention, supra note 40 at Art. 5(1)(c). “The Hilton legacy is the 
application of the doctrine of comity to the recognition of foreign judgments—showing respect for, and 
giving effect to, the decisions of foreign courts.”; Ronald A. Brand, The Continuing Evolution of U.S. 
Judgments Recognition Law, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 277, 282 (2017). In Hilton v. Guyot, Justice 
Gray “determined that cases brought either against a national of the state of the court of origin, or by the 
party against whom the judgment was rendered, presented easy decisions to recognize the result.” Id.   
 42.  November 2017 Draft Convention, supra note 40 at Art. 5(1)(e). 
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mechanism under Article 19, which results in a reciprocal exclusion and is 
structured like the Choice of Court’s Article 21.43 
This approach of building up consensus also works with the idea that 
the convention is a floor, not a ceiling. National law remains, except as it is 
limited for in rem and tenancies in immovable property, as well as possibly 
in some registered intellectual property rights.44 Critics of the structure have 
raised concerns about likely inconsistent application of the many categories 
and unnecessary complication. On the other hand, one could see this “bottom 
up” approach as leaving more room for growth as more harmonization 
develops, as well as leaving flexibility for the convention to be more nimble 
in response to rapidly developing areas of law in the changing economies 
and technologies. One possibility is to view the convention as currently 
drafted as a base to which one could add later protocols like the Capetown 
Convention and even at some point look to tackle and include issues such as 
parallel litigation or lis pendens. Thus the weakness of the convention to 
some may be a strength for maximizing the life of and attractiveness of a 
Hague Judgments Convention. 
IV. A WALK THROUGH THE CONVENTION 
For those not familiar with the convention, a short overview of the 
structure and critical components of the Fourth Special Commission draft of 
May 2018 will provide sufficient background to consider some of the issues 
still remaining for the final diplomatic session in June 2019.45 It is important 
to keep in mind that the current draft is not binding on the final session which 
may renegotiate provisions.46 In drafting the Judgments Convention, the 
delegates took care to utilize the same language, where possible, as that used 
in the smaller and earlier Choice of Court Convention, recognizing that 
 
 43.  One can compare the language in Art. 19 of the Judgments May 2018 draft with Art. 21 of the 
Choice of Court Convention, both using similar language. For a discussion of how Art. 21 works in the 
Choice of Court Convention. See generally Ronald A. Brand & Paul Herrup, The 2005 Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents (2008). 
 44.  E.g., November 2017 Draft Convention, supra note 40, art. 16. “Recognition or enforcement 
under national law: Subject to Article 6, this Convention does not prevent the recognition or enforcement 
of judgments under national law.” 
 45.  See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special Commission on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 2018 Draft Convention (May 24–29, 2018), 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/23b6dac3-7900-49f3-9a94-aa0ffbe0d0dd.pdf; Hague Conference on Private 
International Law: Twenty-Second Session Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 
Judgments Convention: Revised Draft Explanatory Report, Prel. Doc. No. 1 (June 18–July 2 2019), 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/7d2ae3f7-e8c6-4ef3-807c-15f112aa483d.pdf.  
 46.  See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Rules of Procedure, 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/1bc57743-5a7e-4fa2-955b-9dbc9db01561.pdf.  
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minor deviations might be viewed as deliberate rejection or change of 
meaning from the earlier convention. 
The general scope and exclusions from scope appear in Articles 1 and 
2, as possibly modified on an individual country basis under Article 19.47  
Unlike the Choice of Court Convention, consumers are included in this 
convention as are “non-contractual obligation arising from death, physical 
injury, damage to or loss of tangible property…”48 Article 4 sets out the 
general provisions, including requiring that the judgment have effect and be 
enforceable in the rendering forum, F1, to be recognized under the 
convention in F2. Articles 5, 6 and 7 are the heart of the convention. Article 
5 lists the current thirteen bases for recognition and indicates that a judgment 
is “eligible” for recognition and enforcement if it meets one of those 
categories. Article 6 adds a limitation for certain exclusive bases of indirect 
jurisdiction. Article 7 completes the critical provisions, providing grounds 
for discretionary non-recognition of a judgment that has satisfied Article 4 
and 5. It included many traditional grounds, such as due process violations, 
public policy, inconsistent with certain other judgments, and obtained by 
fraud. Interestingly, the fraud provision originally only applied to fraud in 
connection with a matter of procedure or extrinsic fraud, but that portion of 
the “defense” to recognition was deleted, allowing for the potential of 
relitigating underlying matters by claiming intrinsic fraud. The U.S. was not 
in favor of that deletion. National law is incorporated as an independent basis 
for recognition under Art. 16.  Many U.S. academics and practitioners may 
find the structure of the convention difficult to interpret, especially if they 
are not expecting the “laundry list” of grounds for recognition. It is easier to 
appreciate this structure in the context of the negotiations and the process at 
the Hague Conference. 
V. THE ELEPHANT(S) IN THE ROOM 
There are several areas where consensus has not been achieved which 
have been identified for intersessional work in smaller groups.49 These 
include: “(1) the treatment of decisions of competent authorities on validity 
issues of intellectual property rights and the treatment of intellectual property 
related judgments in general; (2) common courts; (3) the relationship with 
other international instruments; (4) the treatment of judgments pertaining to 
governments; and (5) the possible exclusion of anti-trust (competition) 
 
 47.  See Brand & Herrup, supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 48.  November 2017 Draft Convention, supra note 40, art. 5 (1)(j). 
 49.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy, 
Judgments Project: Report on the Special Commission Meeting of May 2018 and Next Steps, Prel. Doc. 
1 (Oct. 2018), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/1580b17f-2e0f-4f19-9b40-bf6702678048.pdf. 
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matters, respectively.”50 Some of these, such as exclusion of intellectual 
property and antitrust, are neither simple nor necessarily likely to be resolved 
by a small informal working group. Rather they are basic policy issues that 
require the government experts who have more authority—those who will 
be at the Diplomatic Session. Issue one, intellectual property, has been a wild 
card from the beginning and has not remained static. Intellectual property is 
incorporated into so much law today, and will be even more integrated with 
time, so that trying to excise some or all of it from the convention may reduce 
the effectiveness of the instrument. In contrast, removing antitrust may be 
easier and would be consistent with the exclusion from scope in Art. 2 of the 
Choice of Court Convention. Areas such as IP, which may be territorial, and 
judgments pertaining to governments raise major sovereignty issues on 
which countries may differ. 
Several other questions remain, such as how does one handle the 
overlap with arbitration, which is excluded from scope under Art. 2 (3); as 
well as country-specific problems, such as where does BREXIT fit in; the 
U.S. concerns with the broad scope of fraud, the tenancies for more than six 
months,51 and how Article 14 will work on statute of limitations. There is 
also concern from a U.S. perspective, but shared by others as well, about the 
number of declarations, which are allowed and listed in Article 30. Some 
question whether the Convention’s value will be diluted due to lack of 
uniformity and predictability among Contracting States, especially when any 
convention is competing in theory with other dispute resolution 
mechanisms—arbitration and mediation. The BREXIT issue is just one 
illustration of the problem of how to implement the convention 
internationally in a way that allows flexibility but enough harmonization. 
And there is the real elephant in the room that hasn’t been discussed 
openly: how is this convention to be implemented internationally? While the 
expansion of The Hague Conference to include more countries across the 
globe as members has been beneficial, that brings with it concerns about the 
judicial and legal systems in some of these. Some governments have 
concerns about having to recognize judgments from countries about whom 
they question their due process and whether their justice systems are fair and 
not corrupt (“country X”). In many legal systems, one could avoid having to 
recognize an incoming judgment by using the public policy exclusion in 
Article 7.  But that is not available in all legal systems, some of which have 
very narrow public policy grounds. In addition, while public policy may 
protect a country from an incoming judgment, one has no control over the 
 
 50.  Id. at 2. 
 51.  Some of us refer to as the “sabbatical rental” problem as considered by Prof. Symeonides. 
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outgoing judgments of the country X which might be against a U.S. party 
who falls within one of the filters for recognition in a country where the party 
might have assets.  On the other hand, any system for bilateralization, even 
if simpler than the 1971 Convention, instead using either an opt-in or opt-
out version, still results in considerable loss of efficiencies. The Hague  
Conference has used two different models in the family law conventions. 
The 1980 Child Abduction Convention uses the “opt-in” model, where 
countries who are Members at the time of the diplomatic conference have to 
agree to be in a treaty relationship with each country that accedes after 
them.52  The practical and diplomatic difficulties connected to this process 
have been evident in several cases and exacerbated by disputes about 
competence between the EU and its member states. Sixteen years later in the 
1996 Child Protection Convention,53 The Hague Conference adopted an opt-
out model for those who join after the diplomatic conference. In each case, 
however, one is “stuck” with a treaty relationship with existing members of 
The Hague Conference at the time of the final diplomatic session, a 
politically sensitive issue for some countries who are not willing to be in 
“partnership” with some existing Hague Conference members. The solution 
of true bilateral agreements only threatens to defeat the value of any 
convention. Diplomats will no doubt negotiate long and hard on this last 
issue to decide if the game is worth the candle. 
The ghost of 2001 has often led members of some delegations to suggest 
that this convention is likely to end up like the “Interim Text” from 2001—
unworkable and lacking predictability and certainty—as evidenced by the 
multiple alternative provisions in brackets throughout the jurisdiction 
provisions.54 It is interesting to note that the first half “diplomatic session” 
in 2001 was the first diplomatic session when the consensus model55 was 
 
 52.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, 28: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, art. 38 (Oct. 25, 1980), 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/e86d9f72-dc8d-46f3-b3bf-e102911c8532.pdf.  
 53.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, 34: Convention of 19 October 1996 on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, art. 58 (Oct. 19, 1996), 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/f16ebd3d-f398-4891-bf47-110866e171d4.pdf.  
 54.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Interim Text - Summary of the Outcome of the 
Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference (6-22 June 2001), Prepared 
by the Permanent Bureau and the Co-reporters (2001), https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-
studies/details4/?pid=3499&dtid=35. 
 55.  The rules of The Hague Conference were officially amended to incorporate the consensus first 
model (voting only if necessary) in 2005. The current rule reads as follows: 
To the furthest extent possible, all decisions shall be taken by consensus. If exceptionally it is 
not possible to attain consensus, decisions shall be taken by vote in accordance with the 
following rules. 
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used, as opposed to voting, a change in approach that perhaps is reflected in 
the vast numbers of brackets to show consensus was lacking. At the time, the 
agreement was that future negotiations (including “Part II”) would revert to 
the voting model, and the internal procedures were only officially amended 
in 2005 at the time of the final Diplomatic Conference for the Choice of 
Court Convention, which also accepted a change to the Statute of the 
Conference that codified the consensus system.56 Fifteen years later, the 
parties seem to have gotten more comfortable with the consensus model and 
seem to understand that brackets are not a solution to every area where 
compromise has not yet been achieved and is likely not to be achieved easily. 
There are fewer brackets, although the legal and policy areas covered by the 
brackets, such as intellectual property, are vast and highly divisive.57 It will 
be interesting to observe whether the limited brackets currently remaining 
expand significantly during the final negotiations in June 2019 or if the 
parties will work harder to find consensus to remove the brackets which 
cannot remain in a final text. Or will they simply delete from scope the hard 
choices? 
 
VI. THE FUTURE OF A JUDGMENTS CONVENTION: PEERING 
INTO THE GLASS BALL 
Should the U.S. become a contracting party to any new instrument (or 
just lead from behind)? The crucial question is: does this convention benefit 
U.S. business, consumers, and government?58 In theory, the convention 
should increase the ability to export U.S. judgments abroad and to a wider 
range of countries than would have been parties to the last effort in 1993–
2001.59 Given the increase in global commerce, U.S. individuals and 
 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Rules of Procedure, available at 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/1bc57743-5a7e-4fa2-955b-9dbc9db01561.pdf. Using consensus in 
negotiations, while new to the Hague Conference, was certainly well-known at UNCITRAL, which uses 
it in its work. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy, 
Judgments Project: Report on the Special Commission Meeting of May 2018 and Next Steps, Prel. Doc. 
1 (Oct. 2018), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/1580b17f-2e0f-4f19-9b40-bf6702678048.pdf. 
 58.  During the negotiations for the 2005 Choice of Court Convention, the U.S. government wanted 
to be sure that the government as a plaintiff could rely on the convention in transactions that had exclusive 
choice of court agreements. Although the role of governments in the new Judgments Convention has been 
an area generating disagreement, much of the concern is not with governments acting in a commercial 
context. 
 59.  However, this also creates issues in connection with what mechanism can be employed for 
joining the convention. Although one would get a broader range of countries for potential enforcement 
of an outgoing judgment, the U.S. may not be happy to be “partners” with all of these and may have 
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businesses (and the government in commercial activities) have cross-border 
transactions with Asian and Latin American countries who have become 
actively involved in The Hague Conference and this negotiation. The new 
China “One Belt One Road”60 initiative also reflects the increasing 
importance of trade in the region.61 
This broader enforcement may have less importance now after the 
restriction of general jurisdiction to where the company is “essentially at 
home,” as shown in Goodyear62 and Daimler,63 and the narrowing of specific 
jurisdiction in Nicastro64 and most recently in Bristol Meyers Squibb.65 The 
impact of this jurisdiction-narrowing case law is that the litigation cannot be 
brought initially in the U.S., and so ironically there will be no U.S. judgment 
to enforce overseas. From the time the negotiations began in 1993 to the 
present, the availability of assets of foreign entities and defendants in the 
U.S. has decreased, and the ability to move these assets to offshore locations 
with a “click of a mouse” has increased exponentially, thus also suggesting 
in theory that there is an increasing need for effective means to enforce U.S. 
judgments abroad. The growth of alternative dispute resolution, not only 
arbitration but also mediation, in commercial transactions is evident from 
statistics and even from UNCITRAL’s just-completed Convention on 
 
concerns recognizing their judgments (incoming) due to due process and systemic/individual corruption. 
Although both could be a basis to refuse recognition, that doesn’t necessarily resolve the problem as the 
judgment could be enforced in other contracting states where a U.S. party has assets or does business. 
See text  at Part V and accompanying supra notes 52–53. 
 60.  SCOTT KENNEDY & DAVID A. PARKER, BUILDING CHINA’S ”ONE BELT, ONE ROAD”, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Apr. 3, 2015), http://csis.org/publication/building-chinas-one-belt-one-
road (“China’s efforts to implement this initiative will likely have an important effect on the region’s 
economic architecture—patterns of regional trade, investment, infrastructure development—and in turn 
have strategic implications for China, the United States, and other major powers”). 
 61.  Reflecting the growing importance of the Asia Pacific area, The Hague Conference opened an 
Asia Pacific Regional office in Hong Kong in 2012. The Secretary General of the Hague Conference, Mr. 
Hans van Loon noted that, “The Asia Pacific Regional Office in Hong Kong will undoubtedly be a 
significant resource for all States in the Asia Pacific Region.” He added, “The Hong Kong office, coupled 
with the support of Member States, will significantly contribute to the visibility of The Hague Conference 
in the Asia Pacific region, the promotion of the work of the Conference and the proper implementation 
and operation of The Hague Conventions, which is ultimately in the interest of all Members of the 
Conference and their citizens.” Hague Conference to Open Asia Pacific Regional Office in Hong Kong, 
Hague Conference on Private International Law (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.hcch.net/en/news-
archive/details/?varevent=256.  
 62.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
 63.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014); see Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another 
Era: Reflections on Daimler and its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 675 (2015). 
 64.  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). The actual impact of this 
narrowing could depend in part on the way the defendant structures its business and distribution of 
products and the relationship of any subsidiary to parent. 
 65.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). 
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International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, which will 
be known as the Singapore Convention on Mediation.66 
The U.S. role in global trade may also suggest a reason not only to be 
at the table in negotiating, but also to go forward with becoming a contracting 
state. Although the negotiations here are not of direct jurisdiction, as a 
practical matter the convention impacts attitudes of direct jurisdiction. The 
fact that the U.S. has successfully negotiated to incorporate an activity-based 
element into contract and tort claims has the potential to lead to increasing 
harmonization of direct jurisdiction, as well as impacting later work.67 
Similarly, the U.S.’s involvement has suggested areas where U.S. law might 
expand to meet changing and developing areas of law. 
Evidence of the potential damage to future work on unification and 
harmonization68 of law can be seen in the response of the EU to U.S. 
proposals, an unstated calculus in their willingness to make changes to 
accommodate U.S. law. This attitude was obvious at an EU hearing in April 
2018 in Brussels before the European Parliament’s JURI Committee69 to 
present a study on “The Hague Conference on Private International Law 
‘Judgments Convention.’” The study was commissioned from a consortium 
of five legal academics at various European institutions to assess the work 
on the Hague Judgments Convention and “its interplay with international and 
Union instruments in the field, as well as its potential future impact on the 
regulation of civil and commercial cross-border disputes.”70 The study 
considers the impact of the convention in selected EU and Third States, 
 
 66.  U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first 
session, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. A/73/17 (June 25–July 13, 2018) (finalization of the Convention) and Annex I 
(text of the U.N. Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation); see also 
Timothy Schnabel, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border 
Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements, SSRN (Sept. 18, 2018).   
 67.  On the other hand, if the U.S. isn’t willing to go forward on this convention at The Hague 
Conference, negotiations on future projects are less likely to incorporate U.S. needs such as the activity 
basis for our constitutional due process. 
 68.  This impact is not limited to The Hague Conference but also could be felt at both UNCITRAL 
and UNIDROIT, as well as regional economic integration organizations such as ASEAN or the EU, as 
many of the participants in negotiations are involved in the other organizations as well. 
 69.  The Public Hearing of the Committee on Legal Affairs 24 April 2018 was preceded by a closed 
hearing, both considering the study commissioned by the Parliament’s Policy department for Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs. The author was privileged to be able to attend the Parliament meeting 
as a guest of one of the principal authors. See Pedro A. de Miguel Asensio et al., The Hague Conference 
on Private International Law “Judgments Convention, European Parliament Pol’y Dep’t For Citizens’ 
Rights & Const. Affairs (April 2018).  
 70.  The study is based not on the final draft pre-diplomatic session but from the earlier November 
2017 draft. The authors of the report are: Pedro A. De Miguel Asensio, Professor, Complutense University 
of Madrid, Spain, Gilles Cuniberti, Professor, University of Luxembourg, Pietro Franzina, Professor, 
University of Ferrara, Italy, Christian Heinze, Professor, Leibniz University of Hannover, Germany Marta 
Requejo Isidro, Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg. Id. at 1. 
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pointing out that “U.S. negotiators have successfully limited the ambition of 
the Convention in accordance with their own standards.”71 The study 
proceeds to look at whether a convention would improve the circulation of 
judgments in some States, determining the impact based on whether the law 
of foreign judgments is more liberal or more restrictive than the proposed 
convention. Highlighting the impact of U.S. law in contractual and tort 
matters, the study suggests two options: either to work to include the U.S., 
“which is the biggest economic partner of the EU,” by accepting what they 
see as “narrow U.S. standards of jurisdiction,” or instead “to explore whether 
a more ambitious and practically useful Convention, following European 
standards of jurisdiction, could be accepted by a significant number of other 
states, in particular in Asia.”72 
In the study’s conclusion and at the oral hearing, the authors were 
skeptical about U.S. ratification, albeit based on a limited perception of the 
internal dynamics of domestic U.S. implementation and federal/state 
implementation.73 “It must be underscored, however, that the strong 
involvement of U.S. negotiators in The Hague is no guarantee that the U.S. 
will eventually ratify the Convention, even if it successfully imposed its 
jurisdictional standards.”74 While the U.S. government has not committed to 
the means of the implementation of any new judgments convention, one path 
that has been speculated about is a package where the Choice of Court 
Convention is implemented domestically, largely through federal law, and 
the larger Judgments Convention would be implemented primarily on the 
 
 71.  See European Parliament, Report, The Hague Conference on Private International Law 
“Judgments Convention,” POL’Y DEP’T FOR CITIZENS’ RIGHTS & CONST. AFFAIRS (April 2018), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604954/IPOL_STU(2018)604954_EN.pdf 
[hereinafter HAGUE STUDY]. 
 72.  See id. For one view of strategy for the EU, see Paul Beaumont, Respecting Reverse 
Subsidiarity as an excellent strategy for the European Union at the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law—reflections in the context of the Judgments Project?, available at 
https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/documents/CPIL_Working_paper_2016_3_revised.pdf. 
 73.  See HAGUE STUDY, supra note 71, at 36–37. The authors are not necessarily accurate about the 
impact of any implementation through a cooperative federalism and the notion that “each state would be 
free to enact or maybe to vary [the implementing law]” (emphasis added). These statements have been 
made primarily by those who favor only federal implementation and who made many of them within the 
context of the Choice of Court Convention, a situation that is not directly in point. For different 
perspectives, see also Linda J. Silberman, The Need for a Federal Statutory Approach to the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments, in STEPHAN, ED., FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND 
THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM, Ch. 5 (26th Sokol Colloquium 2014); David P. Stewart, 
Implementing the Hague Choice of Court Convention: The Argument in Favor of “Cooperative 
Federalism,” in STEPHAN, ED., FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM, 
Ch. 8 (26th Sokol Colloquium 2014); Peter D. Trooboff, Implementing Legislation for the Hague Choice 
of Court Convention, in STEPHAN, ED., FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL 
SYSTEM, Ch. 7 (26th Sokol Colloquium 2014). 
 74.   See HAGUE STUDY, supra note 71, at 37. 
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state level (as it is today) and largely with a state uniform law and limited 
federal law where necessary for structural reasons.75 The U.S., as a federal 
state where judgment enforcement has long been primarily a matter of state 
law, has had to confront difficulties in the private international law area. but 
it has shown that it can achieve effective and agreed implementation in a 
broad range of private international law treaties, from family law to 
intermediated securities, and there is hope that the Judgments Convention 
can be implemented in a way that maintains the current state/federal 
balance.76 
The U.S. has a history of participation in entities working on unification 
and harmonization of law77 and its history at The Hague Conference has 
often been one of leadership.78 The current negotiations threaten that 
reputation and may make the U.S. role significantly less important—and 
possibly irrelevant. The U.S. commitment to multilateral private 
international law instruments and to global trade weighs in the balance, and 
the U.S.’s ability to lead in the future may be strengthened if those with 
whom it negotiates see its  resolve to move forward as part of any binding 
instrument. 
 
 
 75.  The author is a Rhode Island Uniform Law Commissioner, as well as participating in three of 
the four Special Commissions on the Judgments Project as a delegate on the U.S. State Department, 
representing the ULC. The author therefore would hope that the U.S. would implement the Judgments 
Convention in a way that maintains the existing state/federal balance and federalism. The current draft is 
largely compatible with existing state uniform law and with Hilton v. Guyot and common-law and 
cooperative federalism is feasible. One could analogize to certain private international law treaties that 
are compatible with the existing UCC and therefore have been “pre-implemented” and the federal 
implementing legislation maintains the existing state law. The author  also served as co-Reporter with 
Kathleen Patchel until May 2011 of the Uniform Choice of Court Agreements Implementation Act 
(UCCAIA), which is a uniform act that was to help implement the Choice of Court convention in the U.S. 
For a discussion of some of these issues see generally Linda J. Silberman, The Need for a Federal 
Statutory Approach to the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments, in FOREIGN 
COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM (26th Sokol Colloquium), Chapter 5 
(Stephan, ed., 2014.); Peter D. Trooboff, Implementing Legislation for the Hague Choice of Court 
Convention, in FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM (26th Sokol 
Colloquium), Chapter 7 (Stephan, ed., 2014.). 
 76.  For an excellent discussion of the potential for cooperative federalism, see David P. Stewart, 
Implementing the Hague Choice of Court Convention: The Argument in Favor of “Cooperative 
Federalism” in FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM (26th Sokol 
Colloquium), Chapter 8 (Stephan, ed., 2014.); See also supra note 74. 
 77.  Re UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT; and domestically, the beginnings of NCCUSL/ULC 
 78.  The U.S. officially joined in 1964 but many experts had involvement earlier on a personal basis. 
The Permanent Bureau has had only two U.S. diplomat lawyers: Adair Dyer, who served for almost 25 
years, and the author. 
